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ii 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On May 4, 2004, LC Canyon entered into a "Purchase and Sale Agreement" 
[the "Agreement"] with Richard Despain and riiembers of his family acting 
collectively as owner and seller of the North Parcel, for purchase of the North 
Parcel together with other parcels owned by thfe same sellers located on the 
west side of North Little Cottonwood Canyon Road (SR 210). Eastham Depo 
50:20 -51:11, and Ex. 18. LC Canyon wanted to develop a single housing 
unit on the North Parcel. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, ffif 8, 9 [R. 44-45]. 
2. Under the Agreement, LC Canyon was required to purchase the North Parcel 
in order to purchase the property on the west side of North Little Cottonwood 
Canyon Road for its proposed subdivision development. The sellers required 
an "all or nothing" contract, not allowing individual parcels to be purchased 
on a piecemeal basis. Eastham Depo 18:2-5, 18-21, 62:12-18 [R. 192; 214]; 
Kesler Depo 28:5-9,29:5-21 [R. 294-295] . 
3. Mr. Kesler and Mr. Eastham met with County representatives before closing 
the purchase of the North Parcel and felt "comfortable" that their request for 
rezoning a 3.5-acre portion of the North Parcel would be approved. Kesler 
Depo 21:21-22:10 [R. 291-292]. 
4. LC Canyon became aware of the FR-20 zoning of the North Parcel in early 
2004 before purchasing the North Parcel. Under the Agreement, LC Canyon's 
obligation to purchase the North Parcel was n^t made contingent upon its 
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ability to secure the desired rezoning from the County. Eastham Depo 22:4-10 
[R. 196]. Kesler Depo 26:19-24 [R. 293]. 
5. On June 17, 2005, LC Canyon filed an application with the County seeking to 
rezone a 3.5-acre segment of the North Parcel from the existing FR-20 zone to 
the FR-2.5 zone (i.e., forest/recreation uses, minimum lot size 2.5 acres per 
dwelling unit) [the "Rezone Application"]. Eastham Depo 39:7 - 40:6, Ex. 11 
[R. 205-206]. 
6. On October 18, 2005, the Salt Lake County Council ["Council"], acting as the 
County's legislative body, preliminarily approved the Rezone Application by 
ordinance during a public hearing. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint ^|9. In said 
ordinance, the effective date of Council's approval was set fifteen (15) days 
thereafter, i.e., November 2, 2005. Eastham Depo 24:10 - 26:26:21, Ex. 5 
(minutes of October 18, 2005 Council meeting, ordinance approving Rezone 
Application, Sec. 3, p. 551; see Appellant's Brief, App. 3, p. LC 0103) [R. 
221-231]. 
7. On October 25, 2005, the Council voted to reconsider its approval of the 
Rezone Application. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint [^10 [R. 45] . 
8. On November 1, 2005, the Council voted 5 to 2 in a public meeting attended 
by Mr. Eastham and Mr. Kesler to rescind its preliminary approval of the 
Rezone Application. Eastham Depo 28:16 - 30:12, Ex. 6 (minutes of 
November 1, 2005 Council meeting, pp. 574-578; see Appellant's Brief, App. 
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5, pp. SLCO - 00024-00028) [R. 232-242]. 
9. LC Canyon received prior notice of the November 1, 2005 meeting and the 
proposed reconsideration of the Rezone Application through a telephone call 
to Mr. Eastham from a County official. EasthamDepo 64:18 - 65:7 [R.215-
216]; Kesler Depo 60:18 - 61:5 [R. 303-304]. 
10. At the November 1, 2005 Council meeting, both Mr. Eastham and Mr. Kesler 
appeared and spoke in opposition to rescission of the approval of the Rezone 
Application. Eastham Depo 65:6-13, Ex. 6 (minutes of November 1, 2005 
Council meeting, pp. 574-578) [R. 238-242]. 
11. LC Canyon incurred no expense or liability inlreliance on the Council's 
preliminary approval of the Rezone Application on October 18, 2005. 
Eastham Depo 65:17-21 [R. 216]; Kesler Depo 51:22-25 [R. 298]. 
SUMMARY OF THE COUNTY'S ARGUMENT 
LC Canyon never acquired a "vested right" in rezoning of its land because the 
County's initial approval of rezoning never took effect. Moreover, LC Canyon never acted 
or relied upon, the initial rezoning vote of October 18, 2005. The County Council, as the 
County's legislative body, retained power to reconsider, amend or rescind its vote to rezone 
the North Parcel until "something has been done as a result of that vote that the assembly 
cannot undo" (Rule 37 Roberts Rules of Order). This is generally construed as when the 
ordinance became legally "effective." 
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Rule 37 is the default procedural mechanism for rescission as the County has no 
explicit procedure for rescission of an ordinance prior to its effective date. Whether 
intentionally following Rule 37 or not, the Council properly followed the procedures 
outlined in Rule 37 to pass a valid motion to rescind. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
The Council Was Well Within Its Authority To Rescind The Ordinance 
From October IS,2005 when the initial vote was taken until November 1,2005 when 
it was rescinded, the ordinance was "passed/' but had not taklen "effect." Under state law, no 
ordinance passed by the county legislative body may take effect within less than 15 days 
after its passage.1 (emphasis added) Pursuant to the above statute and the overwhelming 
weight of current municipal authority, the Council acted welll within its authority to 
reconsider and rescind its vote to rezone LC Canyon's 15.26 lacre North Parcel from FR-20 
to FR-2.5. Such reconsideration and rescission may take place at a subsequent meeting.2 The 
1UCA§17-53-208(3)(a). 
2 
Dal Maso v. Board of County Com'rs., 182 Md. 200, 206-07, 34 A.2d 464, 467 
(1943)(,f,It is a general rule, subject to certain qualifications hereinafter noted, that a 
Municipal Corporation has the right to reconsider its actions! and ordinances, and adopt a 
measure or ordinance that has previously been defeated of rescind one that has been 
previously adopted before the rights of third parties have vest|ed. Moreover, in the absence 
of statute or a rule to the contrary, the Council may reconsider, adopt or rescind an ordinance 
at a meeting subsequent to that at which it was defeated or adopted, at least where conditions 
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overall purpose of this principle is to give the deliberative body the chance to discover and 
to correct its own errors3. 
(A) Rule 37 of Robert's Rules of Order Provides a Default Procedural 
Mechanism for Rescission 
Salt Lake County does not have an ordinance that specifically addresses the 
procedure to "rescind" an ordinance that has not yet taken efffect. However, according to 
County ordinance, "procedural rules not specifically provided herein or by state law, county 
ordinance, or the plan, may be regulated, interpreted and construed in accordance with 
Robert's Rules of Order."4 The pertinent rule in Roberts Rules of Order is Rule 37 which 
allows an assembly to rescind any vote except: 
votes cannot be rescinded after something has been done as a 
result of that vote that the assembly cannot undo\ or where it is 
in the nature of a contract and the other party i^  informed of the 
fact; or where a resignation has been acted upob5 or one has been 
elected to, or expelled from membership or office, and was 
present or has been officially notified. 
have not changed and no vested rights have intervened!." 37 Am.Jur. sec. 150, p. 
762.")(emphasis added). 
3 
See, e.g., In re Fain. 65 Cal.App.3d 376, 389, 135 Call.Rptr. 543, 550 (1976): "Any 
deliberative body-administrative, judicial or legislative-has th? inherent power to reconsider 
an action taken by it unless the action is such that it mat not be set aside or unless 
reconsideration is precluded by law. The power of administrative reconsideration is 
consistent with the principle that 'notions of administrative autonomy require that the agency 
be given a chance to discover and correct its own error^"(emphasis added; citations 
omitted). 
4Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances §2.04.180 A.: 
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Thus, pursuant to County Ordinance Sec 2.04.180.A., the default procedure for rescission of 
an ordinance that has not vested or taken effect is Rule 37 of Roberts Rules of Order. 
Contrary to appellant's argument, Rule 36 of Robertls Rules of Order is never 
invoked under Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances §2.04.|180.A because County 
ordinance contains an express provision for "rehearing" or ^reconsideration." Both parties 
agree, albeit under different legal theories, that a Rule 36 motion was unavailable to the 
Council.5 Moreover, under Robert's Rules of Order, a Rule !37 motion is not dependent 
upon a prior Rule 36 motion. In fact, if the question of rescission may be reached through a 
motion to reconsider which has already been made, it must be done by recalling the motion 
to reconsider.6 Therefore, under the default provision of County Ordinance and Rule 37 of 
Robert's Rules of Order, the Council properly considered a motion to rescind their vote. 
While LC Canyon argues that as a matter of course, tljie vote on October 25, 2005 
created vested rights, the argument fails because the rezoning ordinance did not, and could 
not under state law, vest or take effect. Moreover, the facts ^re undisputed that there was no 
detrimental reliance, or any development action taken for th^t matter, by LC Canyon 
5LC Canyon argues in its opening brief at pg. 26-29 thkt under the timing outlined 
in Rule 36, a motion to reconsider was unavailable for the Council and the County asserts 
in its brief at pg. 31-32 that the Council never defaulted to Rule 36 as there is a more 
specific County ordinance. 
6
"[A motion to rescind] cannot be made if the questiori can be reached by calling 
up the motion to reconsider which has been previously made.r Rule 37, Robert's Rule of 
Order. 
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between the initial passage on October 18, 2005 and November 1, 2005.7 Rule 37 is 
consistent with the Council's inherent authority to review and correct its own acts sua 
sponte before vested rights attach. 
(B) The Council Properly Followed the Procedures Outlined in Rule 37 of 
Robert's Rules of Order 
Rule 37 provided the Council with two procedural methods for conducting a valid 
motion to rescind. Rule 37 allows a motion to rescind as follows: 
Any vote taken by an assembly, except those n^entioned further 
on, may be rescinded by a majority vote, provided notice of the 
motion has been given at the previous meeting or in the call for 
this meeting; or it may be rescinded without notice by a two-
thirds vote, or by a vote of a majority of the entire membership. 
Procedurally, the Council's vote to rescind met both standards outlined in Rule 37. A 
review of the County Council minutes from November 1, 200 58 indicates that at its previous 
meeting on October 25, 2005, the Council provided notice thftt it was reconsidering its vote 
to rezone LC Canyon's North Parcel. Additionally, the Council provided actual notice to LC 
Canyon of its intent.9 Thus, the Council met the procedural requirements of the first method 
to bring a valid motion to rescind outlined in Rule 37. 
Even if the notice provided on October 25, 2005 were Iconstrued to be deficient under 
the notice provision of Rule 37, the Council's motion to rescind the vote to rezone did not 
7The remaining exceptions in Rule 37 are inapplicable to this matter. See, 
Appellant's opening brief pg. 18-26 and Statement of Relevant Facts ^[11. 
8Exhibit B County Council November 1, 2005 minutes 
Statement of Relevant Facts ^|9. 
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require notice because it passed by a 5 to 2 vote, which is a two-thirds majority vote. 
Therefore in accordance with Rule 37, no notice was required for a valid motion to rescind, 
once the vote passed by a two-thirds majority vote. In sum, |the Council was well within its 
right under and properly followed the procedures in Rule 37| to rescind their vote to rezone 
LC Canyon's 15.26 acre North Parcel from FR-20 to FR-2.51 on November 1, 2005. 
CONCLUSION 
The Council properly moved to rescind its October 1^, 2005 vote to rezone the 15.26 
acre parcel on November 1, 2005. Under its inherent authority to review and reconsider its 
action before reliance by third parties, the Council moved to Irescind its vote. The Council-
whether inadvertently or intentionally—properly followed the procedure outlined in Rule 37 
of Robert's Rules of Order. Therefore, the motion to rescind is valid. 
DATED this £ 2 Slay of June, 2011. 
SIM GILL 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
By: 
DONALD 4 . HANSEN 
MELANIE F. MITCHELL 
THOMAS L. CHRISTENSEN 
Deputy District Attorneys 
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